Europe Thinks it Can’t Deter Russia Without America. It’s Already Doing So

Europe is in trouble. For decades, the United States has been Europe’s primary security guarantor. That arrangement now looks increasingly fragile. Political crises are pulling the two sides of the Atlantic apart, placing at risk the security framework Europe has relied on since the end of the Second World War.

American leaders have never been shy about reminding Europe of this dependency. In 2016, President Barack Obama spoke of the United States’ “unwavering commitment” to Europe’s defense. A year later, Vice President Joe Biden praised the bond forged through NATO. Donald Trump, meanwhile, repeatedly criticized European allies for underinvesting in defense and relying too heavily on American protection.

The message has always been clear: the United States is Europe’s main deterrent against Russia—and Europe knows it. This reality explains why European leaders defer to Washington, why NATO’s top military commander is always American, and why NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte infamously referred to Trump as “Daddy” in June 2025.

There is just one problem with this worldview: it is no longer accurate.

With the threat of rapid, highly localized attacks hanging over Russia’s neighbors, American forces in Europe are both too small and too far removed to credibly deter Kremlin adventurism. As European states rearm, deterrence is increasingly provided by countries bordering Russia, supported by forward-deployed European NATO forces already on the ground.

The United States as a Valuable Partner

None of this is meant to disparage the United States. The scale of American military power remains unmatched. One often-cited statistic captures this reality perfectly: the U.S. Air Force is the largest air force in the world, while the second-largest belongs to the U.S. Navy. When it comes to military capacity, the United States operates on a level no other country can match.

Without American involvement, Europe’s militaries—capable though they are—would face serious difficulties. Designed to operate as interlocking components alongside U.S. forces, European militaries still suffer from major capability gaps that would become glaringly obvious in a scenario where Washington no longer contributes meaningfully to Europe’s defense.

The United States continues to provide critical enablers without which Europe would struggle to function militarily. These include strategic intelligence assets such as drones, aircraft, and satellites, as well as strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling capabilities. Operational cohesion also depends heavily on NATO’s command structure, with key positions—Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Allied Air Command, Allied Land Command, and Joint Forces Command Naples—traditionally held by American officers.

Europe also lacks the sheer mass and firepower to fight alone. Artillery shortages, missile defense gaps, and underdeveloped electronic warfare capabilities remain persistent issues. While progress is being made—Rheinmetall, for example, now produces more 155mm artillery shells than the entire United States—these improvements take time to fully materialize.

All of these capabilities are available to Europe through NATO’s Article 5 guarantee, which obligates the United States to come to Europe’s defense in the event of an attack. America’s extensive basing network across Europe further deepens this commitment, creating both a vested interest in regional stability and a “tripwire” effect, where any attack on U.S. troops would almost certainly trigger escalation.

When this article argues that the United States is no longer Europe’s primary deterrent against Russia, it is not denying America’s military dominance or its central role within NATO. Rather, it is questioning whether American forces are positioned—and structured—to stop the kind of conflict Russia is most likely to initiate.

The U.S. Presence Is More Limited Than It Appears

Despite the perception of overwhelming American protection, the reality on the ground is far more modest. At the height of the Cold War, over one million U.S. soldiers were stationed in Europe. That number steadily declined after 1991, falling to just 63,000 by 2013. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, additional troops were deployed, bringing today’s total to somewhere between 75,000 and 105,000.

In comparison, Poland fields roughly 216,000 troops, while France and Germany maintain forces of approximately 204,000 and 185,000 soldiers respectively. By sheer size, the U.S. Army presence in Europe ranks between Romania and Greece—important, but far from decisive.

Compounding this issue is dispersion. U.S. forces are spread across more than 40 bases throughout Europe, including personnel assigned to U.S. Africa Command. Some of these troops, though counted in European totals, are not directly responsible for European defense.

Germany hosts the largest contingent, with around 34,500 troops, followed by Italy with 12,300 and the United Kingdom with 10,000. These deployments reflect Cold War-era priorities, when American forces faced the Soviet Union across the Iron Curtain. Today, however, these locations are poorly aligned with NATO’s expanded eastern frontier. Troops stationed in western Germany are a long way from Finland, the Baltic states, or Romania.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Washington made limited adjustments. It reinforced existing units and continued Operation Atlantic Resolve, initiated after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. This operation rotates roughly 7,000 troops through Eastern Europe in nine-month cycles. The United States also participates in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, launched in 2017 and expanded significantly in 2022, placing multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

Still, the overarching problem remains structural rather than political. Donald Trump’s skepticism toward alliance commitments and his rhetoric regarding Greenland certainly exacerbate tensions, but the deeper issue is that the United States cannot be everywhere at once. The December 2025 National Security Strategy made this explicit, prioritizing Europe’s stabilization so American forces can pivot toward the Indo-Pacific and the growing risk of conflict with China over Taiwan.

As part of this shift, U.S. troop levels in Europe have quietly declined. Today, only around 1,000 U.S. troops remain in Romania, with roughly 2,000 stationed across the Baltic states.

How Russia Is Likely to Fight

America’s deterrence posture in Europe is still rooted in Cold War assumptions—specifically, the fear of a full-scale invasion of the continent. Against such a scenario, 75,000 to 105,000 U.S. troops would be more than sufficient, especially when combined with Europe’s 1.4 million active-duty soldiers and America’s ability to rapidly reinforce from across the Atlantic.

But Russia understands this too. A conventional war with NATO would be disastrous, and Moscow has little incentive to pursue it. Instead, any future conflict is far more likely to take the form of a limited, fast-moving operation designed to achieve objectives before NATO can react.

Russia’s initial invasion plan for Ukraine offers a near-perfect case study. In early 2022, Russian forces advanced to within 24 kilometers of Kyiv, achieving overwhelming local force superiority. The plan was to decapitate the Ukrainian government within hours, seize the capital within days, and force collapse within ten. That this plan failed does not invalidate the logic behind it—it merely highlights the risks of execution.

This approach has worked before. Variations of it were used in Georgia, Transnistria, Dagestan, Chechnya, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine. The Baltic states, with their Russian-speaking minorities and proximity to Russian forces, remain particularly vulnerable to such tactics.

Europe, Not the U.S., Is the Main Deterrent

Against a lightning-fast attack aimed at achieving a fait accompli, U.S. forces in Eastern Europe would offer only limited resistance. Reinforcements from Germany, Italy, or the UK would arrive weeks too late. NATO war games conducted in 2016 suggested Russian forces could reach Tallinn and Riga within 30 to 60 hours.

Logistics remain NATO’s Achilles’ heel. Eastern Europe’s infrastructure is poorly integrated with Western military networks, rail gauges differ, bridges cannot support modern armor, and moving a single light brigade requires thousands of railcars. A 2025 Financial Times report estimated that large-scale troop movements eastward could take up to 45 days.

This reality explains why Russia has not yet attempted such a move: deterrence does exist—but it is largely European. NATO’s multinational battlegroups, totaling roughly 30,000 troops, provide a credible first line of defense. These forces are overwhelmingly European, supported by nearly 300,000 troops from countries bordering Russia.

These nations—Poland, Finland, the Baltic states—understand the threat because they live with it daily. They spend more on defense, mobilize society as a whole, and field forces where they are most needed.

Conclusion

Europe is no longer protected primarily by American power. It is protected by its own.

This should not be seen as a failure of the alliance, but as its evolution. As Europe assumes responsibility for its own defense, the United States gains the freedom to focus its overstretched military where it matters most.

America will remain a vital ally. But Europe’s security now rests, first and foremost, with the countries on Russia’s border—the ones who saw this coming, prepared for it, and stepped up when it mattered.